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In October 2017, most European countries reported unique
atmospheric detections of aerosol-bound radioruthenium (106Ru).
The range of concentrations varied from some tenths of μBq·m−3 to
more than 150 mBq·m−3. The widespread detection at such consider-
able (yet innocuous) levels suggested a considerable release. To com-
pare activity reports of airborne 106Ru with different sampling periods,
concentrations were reconstructed based on the most probable plume
presence duration at each location. Based on airborne concentration
spreading and chemical considerations, it is possible to assume that the
release occurred in the Southern Urals region (Russian Federation). The
106Ru age was estimated to be about 2 years. It exhibited highly soluble
and less soluble fractions in aqueous media, high radiopurity (lack of
concomitant radionuclides), and volatility between 700 and 1,000 °C, thus
suggesting a release at an advanced stage in the reprocessing of nuclear
fuel. The amount and isotopic characteristics of the radioruthenium
release may indicate a context with the production of a large 144Ce
source for a neutrino experiment.
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Nuclear accidents are serious threats due to their immediateand perceived consequence for both health and environ-
ment. The lay public thus relies on the responsibility of their
leaders to provide information on radioactive releases and their
impact on human and environment health. Early in the 1960s,
and even more after the Chernobyl accident, European radio-
protection authorities established or strengthened radionuclide
monitoring networks on a national scale. Today most of these
European networks are connected to each other via the informal
“Ring of Five” (Ro5) platform for the purpose of rapid exchange
of expert information on a laboratory level about airborne ra-
dionuclides detected at trace levels. The Ro5 was founded in the
mid-1980s by 5 member countries: Sweden, Federal Republic of
Germany, Finland, Norway, and Denmark. Today, the mem-
berships have grown to laboratories in 22 countries (while the
name was kept), and the Ro5 is still an informal arrangement on
a laboratory level and between scientists. In January 2017, the
Ro5 alerted its members regarding the widespread detection of
airborne 131I in Europe (1). In October 2017, an unprecedented
release of ruthenium-106 (106Ru; T1/2 = 371.8 d) into the atmo-
sphere was the subject of numerous detections and exchanges within
the Ro5. The goal of this report is to give an overview of the global
spreading of this fission product through airborne concentrations
observed in Europe and beyond, its forensic history, and chemistry.
Chronology of the Event
On October 2, 2017, an informal alert by an Italian laboratory
was issued to the Ro5 network, reporting the detection of air-
borne 106Ru in the millibecquerel per cubic meter (mBq·m−3)
range in Milan, Italy. Limits of detection (LOD) in laboratories
connected to the Ro5 are typically in the range of 0.1 to 10
microbecquerels per cubic meter (μBq·m−3). This first report oc-
curred on a Monday, when most European laboratories usually
exchange their aerosol filters, which are operated on a weekly
basis. Later that day, 106Ru detections were reported from Czech
Republic, Austria, and Norway in the 1- to 10-mBq·m−3 range.
This widespread detection in such range immediately suggested a
considerable release.
After 2 d (and further detection reports from Poland, Austria,
Switzerland, Sweden, and Greece), official information notes
were published by national radioprotection authorities, for ex-
ample, in Switzerland, Austria, and Norway. On October 7, 2017,
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requested data
and possible known sources of radioruthenium from all 43 Eu-
ropean member states. On October 9, 2017, Chelyabinsk and
Sverdlovsk regional authorities ruled out any possible 106Ru re-
lease from their region (Russian Federation). On November 21,
2017, the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and
Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet) declared to have
measured 106Ru in the southern Urals in the late September (2).
However, one possible source in the region, the Federal State
Unitary Enterprise “Production Association Mayak” in Ozersk,
immediately declared that it was not the source of increased
106Ru (3). On November 23, 2017, the IAEA addressed the re-
lease of 106Ru in a press conference. All members submitted the
requested data, but none declared an accident and none de-
clared being aware of any source. On December 8, 2017, Russian
officials once again claimed that Mayak could not be the source
because of the lack of any radioruthenium traces in the soil
around the facility (4). Instead, the officials pointed at the possibility
of a radionuclide battery of a satellite that had burned during its
reentry into the atmosphere. On January 22, 2018, the Nuclear
Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences invited radia-
tion protection experts from Germany, France, Finland, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and Russia to aid in the elucidation of the
release. Two commissions of inquiry were held: on January 31,
2018 and on April 11, 2018. The second meeting concluded by
emphasizing that not enough data were yet available to point out
any verified hypothesis of the origin of the 106Ru (5). The present
article aims at closing this gap.
Results and Discussion
Monitoring Results. Information sources: The entire airborne
concentration dataset and deposition dataset are available as SI
Appendix, Tables S1–S4 and were mainly compiled through
Ro5 exchanges, personal exchange, and data already published.
Valuable information are also available on the Roshydromet website
(6, 7), on the Typhoon Association website (6), and on the website
of the Unified State Automated Monitoring System of the Radiation
Situation in the Russian Federation (8). Data from the Com-
prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) (9)
are not part of the dataset except for those already published
(10). The International Monitoring System (IMS) data supporting
the CTBTO (9) are available directly from the CTBTO upon re-
quest and signing a confidentiality agreement to access the virtual
Data Exploitation Platform. This study provides 106Ru observations
(>1,120 data points related to airborne activity and about 200 data
points for deposited contamination, from about 330 sampling
locations) that can be used for the purpose of atmospheric
dispersion and deposition model validation.
With the exception of the westernmost parts of Europe, most
monitoring stations reported detections of 106Ru in the range
between some tenths μBq·m−3 meter and more than a 100 mBq·m−3.
Fig. 1 illustrates the maximum activity levels per country. Activity
concentrations in the millibecquerel per cubic meter range were
reported between September 29, 2017 and October 7, 2017,
exhibiting a short build-up and rapid decline behavior. The last
traces of the plume (microbecquerel per cubic meter range) were
measured in sampling periods ending between October 12, 2017 and
the end of October by laboratories equipped with high-volume
samplers and low-level γ-ray spectrometry. The eastern and south-
eastern parts of Europe, including western Russia, exhibited the
highest reported levels. The maximum level in Europe was reported
from Romania (176 ± 18 mBq·m−3). Even at this level, the plume
did not represent any threat for human and environmental health.
However, it is important to note that these compiled data were
obtained with different sampling durations, which limits their
comparability without further correction.
Outside Europe, 106Ru was also detected east of the geo-
graphical border between Europe and Asia in the Urals region
(Russian Federation) with activity levels of some tens mBq·m−3.
Tiny amounts of 106Ru were also pointed out elsewhere in the
northern hemisphere by aerosol stations belonging to the IMS
supporting the CTBTO: in Guadeloupe, Kuwait, Florida (United
States), Russia (central and eastern parts), and Mongolia. 106Ru is a
Significance
A massive atmospheric release of radioactive 106Ru occurred in
Eurasia in 2017, which must have been caused by a sizeable, yet
undeclared nuclear accident. This work presents the most com-
pelling monitoring dataset of this release, comprising 1,100 at-
mospheric and 200 deposition data points from the Eurasian
region. The data suggest a release from a nuclear reprocessing
facility located in the Southern Urals, possibly from the Mayak
nuclear complex. A release from a crashed satellite as well as a
release on Romanian territory (despite high activity concentrations)
can be excluded. The model age of the radioruthenium supports
the hypothesis that fuel was reprocessed ≤2 years after discharge,
possibly for the production of a high-specific activity 144Ce source
for a neutrino experiment in Italy.
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nuclide that may be released upon detonation of a nuclear weapon,
and is therefore a “CTBT-relevant radionuclide.”
106Ru had not been detected in the global atmosphere since
the Chernobyl accident (11) [estimated release <73 PBq (12)], not
even after the Fukushima accident on the Japanese territory (13,
14), because of the different accident and release characteristics.
As a result, there is no usual background or reference level, which
could be used to define an increasing factor. As a matter of fact,
this radionuclide is usually not detected in the atmosphere. Besides
aerosol filtration, gaseous sampling was conducted at some loca-
tions (Austria, Sweden, Italy, and Poland), thus allowing checking
for the presence of gaseous Ru species. Ruthenium may be present
in volatile forms, especially in the form of ruthenium tetroxide,
RuO4 (15). Since gaseous RuO4 is a highly reactive and strong
oxidizer, it is expected to rapidly nucleate into particulate and low
volatile RuO2. No
106Ru was detected in gaseous form.
In addition to 106Ru, the anthropogenic ruthenium isotope 103Ru
(T1/2 = 39.3 d) was detected at a limited number of high-performing
stations (SI Appendix, Table S2): Austria, Czech Republic, Poland,
and Sweden (10) with activity levels ranging from 0.04 to 7.3 μBq·m−3
(average 2.6 ± 0.1 μBq·m−3). The average ratio 103Ru/106Ru was
about (2.7 ± 0.9)·10−4, and the minimum 106Ru activity concen-
tration associated with a 103Ru detection was about 4 mBq·m−3 (SI
Appendix, Table S4). Several organizations in Europe analyzed the
filters for the occurrence of other γ-emitters, as well as difficult-to-
measure radionuclides, such as Pu, Am, Cm, or 90Sr by low-level
radiochemical analyses. No unusual traces were found that would
have been indicative of a release of any of these radionuclides
concurrently with the 103,106Ru. This excludes an accidental release
from a nuclear reactor as the source, as this would have resulted
in an emission of a great multitude of fission products. Instead,
the origin of 103,106Ru is rather associated with nuclear fuel
reprocessing or with (medical or technical) radioactive sources. In
addition, no unusual (stable) element contamination was found on
a 106Ru-containing filter from Vienna (Austria) (16).
Discussion of a Possible Source Melting. Melting of radioactive
sources already occurred in the past, leading to detection of ra-
dionuclides in several European countries. Indeed, at the end of
May 1998, a 137Cs source estimated 0.3 to 3 TBq was incidentally
melted in a steelworks near Algeciras (Spain) and led to detec-
tions in several European countries (17). 106Ru in ophthalmic
radiotherapy sources have typical activities less than 10 MBq,
which is clearly insufficient to explain the observed concentrations
on a wide scale, as emphasized by the IAEA (18), as it would have
required the melting of numerous ophthalmic sources at once.
Discussion of a Possible Satellite Reentry. The possibility of the
disintegration of a satellite equipped with a radioisotope ther-
moelectric generator (RTG) operated with a 106Ru source during
its reentry into the atmosphere, as vaguely indicated previously
(19), warrants investigation. Generally, such a source appears rather
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Fig. 1. Compiled maximum 106Ru airborne “uncorrected” activity concentrations (in mBq·m−3; sampling period in parentheses) in Europe.
Table 1. Comparison of airborne 106Ru at high-altitude and at closest low-altitude sampling locations (with similar time stamps)
Country
High-altitude location
(meters above sealevel) Date (2017)
106Ru
(mBq·m−3)
Nearest low-altitude
location Date (2017)
106Ru
(mBq·m−3)
Austria Sonnblick (3,105) October 2 0.17 ± 0.11 Klagenfurt October 2 4.90 ± 0.34
Bulgaria Moussala peak (2,925) October 3 1.8 ± 0.54 Yana September 29 to
October 4
17.6 ± 1.6
Greece Helmos Mountain
peak (2,314)
September 27 to
September 29
0.99 ± 0.19 Athens September 27 to
October 3
2.64 ± 0.63
Germany Zugspitze (2,964) September 25 to
October 2
<0.026 Garmisch-Partenkirchen September 25 to
October 2
<0.023
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unlikely because of the rather short half-life of 106Ru compared with
the expected or desired satellite life span and the low power level
(∼33 W·g−1) generated by a 106Ru-powered RTG and radiation
protection issues during its manufacture and handling. In addition,
several space organizations concluded that no satellite went missing
during the 106Ru episode (SI Appendix). Other arguments are
also not in favor of the satellite disintegration hypothesis. If a
satellite had burned during its reentry into the atmosphere, it would
have caused a vertical distribution of 106Ru in the air: the higher the
altitude, the higher the concentration. However, 106Ru at high-altitude
locations was either below LOD or significantly lower than 106Ru
registered above LOD at low altitude (Table 1). The very low
level (below LOD) at the station on Zugspitze mountain (Germany)
is also very indicative of low concentrations at high altitude. In ad-
dition, the levels of 7Be (a cosmogenic radionuclide produced in the
upper troposphere/lower stratosphere and used as a tracer of atmo-
spheric movement) remained close to usual range, thus indicating that
no downdraft from the lower stratosphere or upper troposphere
occurred at that time. Therefore, the 106Ru release has likely
happened in the lower tropospheric layers and cannot be linked to
a satellite disintegration. Moreover, the concomitant detections of
infinitesimal traces of 103Ru and traces of 106Ru at some locations
definitely outmoded the satellite reentry hypothesis due to the
short 103Ru half-life (T1/2 = 39.3 d).
Sequence of Airborne 106Ru Detections in Europe. Most early 106Ru
detections occurred on the aerosol filters sampled during week
39 (September 25 to October 2, 2017), regardless of the location
in Europe, including Russia (September 26 to October 1, 2017).
In Ukraine, 106Ru was first detected in the sampling period from
September 22 to September 29, 2017. Within the framework of
national monitoring programs of airborne radionuclides, most aerosol
samplings in Europe are performed either on a weekly basis for
γ-counting or on a daily basis (in the vicinity of nuclear facilities),
first for the purpose of gross β-counting by plant operators, or for
γ-counting, for example, within the IMS network. Aerosol filters
sampled in Romania were acquired with the highest temporal
resolution (down to 5 h plus 1-h shutdown intervals). After sampling,
filters of 2 or 4 sequences were compiled before measurement,
thus reflecting 10-h sampling of 12 to 20 h of 24 for each com-
posite sample. In addition, the Romanian network consists of
several tens of aerosol sampling stations, which made it possible
to reconstruct the pattern of the 106Ru plume. The duration of
the episode proved to be rather short: at more than 30 Roma-
nian sampling locations that detected 106Ru, this radionuclide
was detectable on exclusively 1 d (30% of sampling locations), on
2 consecutive days (45%) and on 3 consecutive days (25%).
Detections over 2 or 3 consecutive days indicate that the plume
presence in Romania was rather short and characterized by a
narrow peak (Fig. 2).
The shapes of the Romanian time series match with a short
release (i.e., typically less than 1 d), subject to the wind direction
did not vary a lot during transport and that the plume border did
not undulate while passing at the sampling locations. The de-
tection pattern also provides vague distance-related information
on the release point of 106Ru, as multiple Romanian stations
detected the plume simultaneously. This is only possible if the
plume originated at a sufficiently remote release point to have
time to widen to the width of Romania (approximately 600 km)
(Fig. 3). Although highest activity concentrations of this 106Ru
episode (>100 mBq·m−3) have been reported for Romania, the
width of the plume supports excluding a release point on the
Romanian territory.
All eastern Romanian stations reported airborne 106Ru on
September 29, 2017. From September 30, 2017, the general trend
indicated a 106Ru front traveling westwards. Peak values were
noticed between September 29 and October 1, 2017, depending on
the location. On October 1, 2017, eastern stations ceased their
detections. From October 4, 2017, no more detection was repor-
ted fromRomania. In Bulgaria, the 106Ru plume was also assumed
to be present only 3 to 4 d (mostly from October 2 to October 4,
2017) (20), about 3 d in Austria and Czech Republic, and over 4 d
in Hungary (21). These observations clearly confirm both the
shortness of the plume length and the eastern origin of the plume.
The discussion of the plume duration exemplifies that in many
cases, the sampling duration was longer than the plume duration
(21). As a result, a significant fraction of uncontaminated air was
pumped through the filter, thus “diluting” the 106Ru activity con-
centration in most cases. To encompass the entire plume duration
regardless of the location, we chose a 7-d integration period. In
practice, this decreases the average airborne 106Ru concentration
for locations where the 106Ru plume was detected over a period
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Fig. 2. Airborne 106Ru concentrations (mBq·m−3) at Romanian locations (values have been attributed to the midsampling date of the composite samples).
The connecting lines between data points are only meant to guide the eye.
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of <7 d (because the absolute amount of 106Ru was mathematically
“diluted” with more clean air), while it consequently increases the
106Ru concentration for sampling periods >7 d (as the plume is
mathematically “concentrated”with a smaller amount of air) (Fig. 4).
This mathematical unification of the sampling periods lets that
the corrected values obtained in Romania no longer stand out as
the highest, while it can be observed that they are in the same range
from the Urals to southern-central Europe as a result of the con-
servation of the absolute amount of 106Ru transported along the
route of the air masses.
At the Romanian laboratory of Zimnicea—that is, the location
with the highest uncorrected value (176 ± 18 mBq·m−3, detected
on September 30, 2017 between 3 AM and 2 PM local time)—a
Hybrid Single Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory Model
(HYSPLIT) back-trajectory analysis shows that air masses came
from Russia and then traveled across Ukraine (Fig. 5).
The trajectory model suggests that air masses arriving at
Zimnicea on September 30, 2017 had previously traveled close to
the Mayak industrial complex around September 25, 2017 at an
altitude of at most about 500 m. According to Roshydromet (2),
the meteorological situation in the Southern Urals and central
part of European Russia during the period of September 25 to
October 6, 2017 was due to a vast anticyclone centered around
the White Sea (south of the Kola Peninsula) practically merging
with an anticyclone in the central part of Western Siberia. Their
report (2) reads, “As a result, conditions for an active transfer of
air masses and pollutants from the territory of the Southern Urals
and southern Siberia to the Mediterranean region and, then, to the
north of Europe, arose in the southern part of Western Siberia, in
the Southern Urals, in the Caspian lowland and Ciscaucasia.”
Among the different every 3-h back-trajectories, only 2 passed very
close to the Mayak industrial complex. The detection of the 106Ru
plume at Zimnicea on September 30, 2017 hence indicates a release
from Mayak would have occurred between September 25, 2017,
around 6 PM coordinated universal time (UTC) and September
26, 2017, around noon (UTC) (Fig. 5).
Fig. 4. (Left) Map of uncorrected average concentrations at European stations, and (Right) map of 7-d corrected average concentrations (based on average
plume duration of 7 d at each location).
Fig. 3. Daily maps of above-LOD airborne 106Ru (red dots) in Romania from September 28 to October 5, 2017. Gray dots indicate sampling locations with
106Ru levels below the respective limits of detection at the given time.
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The Mayak Production Association was one of the first and
largest nuclear facilities of the former Soviet Union and spearheaded
the Soviet nuclear weapons program. In the Cold War era, it
hosted a total of 10 nuclear reactors, mainly for the production of
weapons-grade plutonium. In 2014, the Mayak complex employed
∼12,000 people and hosted 2 reactors for isotope production, storage
facilities for nuclear materials, and a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility
(22). On September 29, 1957, a chemical explosion took place in a
radioactive waste storage tank at the Mayak nuclear complex,
causing a massive release of radionuclides. The accident became
known as the “Kyshtym accident.” In the course of this accident, about
2,700 TBq of 106Ru (together with various other radionuclides)
were released into the environment, causing a significant contam-
ination in a more than 100-km-long strip that has been termed the
East Urals Radioactive Trace (23). More than 10,000 residents had
to be evacuated (24). The Kyshtym accident was retrospectively
rated at level 6 on the International Nuclear and Radiological
Event Scale.
Although such incidents have become rare events in recent
years, 106Ru was released from nuclear reprocessing facilities in
the past on multiple occasions. On September 26, 1973, follow-
ing an exothermic reaction at the Windscale reprocessing plant
(United Kingdom), 35 workers were contaminated through an
atmospheric release of 106Ru estimated at 0.37 TBq (25). On April
6, 1993, an explosion at the reprocessing plant of the Tomsk-7
nuclear complex (Siberia, Russian Federation) led to the release
of approximately 0.52 TBq of 106Ru among other fission products
and actinides (26, 27). About 200 km2 were contaminated. On
May 18, 2001 and October 31, 2001, a failure in the vitrification
shops at the La Hague reprocessing plant (France) led to an at-
mospheric release of 106Ru. Based on aerosols sampled at 200 km
downwind from the stack and grass sampled in the vicinity, the
first release was estimated between 0.005 and 0.05 TBq, while the
second was estimated to range between 0.0005 and 0.02 TBq (28).
Significant atmospheric releases also occurred from the early Hanford
operations that were linked to United States nuclear weapons
production, with 106Ru (14 TBq from 1944 to 1972) being a rela-
tively minor constituent (compared with 2.7 EBq 131I in the same
time span) (29). For comparison, the present, undeclared accident
released an estimated activity of 250 TBq at once.
Ruthenium Deposition across Europe. Besides airborne activity de-
terminations, several rainwater, plant, and soil samples attested
the deposition of 106Ru across Europe (SI Appendix, Tables
S3 and S4). Most deposition arose from rain events that occurred
between the last week of September 2017 and the first week of
October, as for example at several Scandinavian sampling loca-
tions (up to about 50 Bq·m−2 in Sweden and about 50–90 Bq·m−2
in Finland) or, for example, in Greece in the second week of
October (30). In Poland (up to about 80 Bq·m−2), a washout
ratio ([106Rurain]/[
106Ruair]) of at least 4,900 was found. In central
Europe, fallout deposition reached 5 Bq·m−2 in Vienna (Austria)
between October 3 and October 5, 2017; 40 Bq·m−2 in Ostrava
(Czech Republic) fromOctober 2 to October 3, 2017; and 8 Bq·m−2
in Udine (northeastern Italy) the last week of September 2017 and
the first week of October (SI Appendix, Tables S3 and S4). The
majority of the highest surface-deposition records have been
reported from locations within 20 km from the Mayak complex:
Khudaiberdinskiy, Argayash, Novogorny, and Metlino (31, 32),
where the surface deposition reached up to 343 Bq·m−2. However,
the sole accumulation of positive reports from the vicinity of the
Mayak facilities, by itself, is not a conclusive indication of the
source, as a nuclear facility naturally is more densely monitored
than nonnuclear areas. Depending on the official Russian source,
levels are highly variable: up to a factor of 10 that can arise from
the deposition pattern.
Fig. 5. HYSPLIT-based 240-h backward trajectories ending at the Romanian monitoring station in Zimnicea (black star) (43.666 N, 25.666 E), every 3 h on
September 30, 2017, from 2 AM to 11 PM UTC. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) HYSPLIT model uses Global Data Assimilation
System (GDAS) meteorological data. The Model Vertical Velocity was used as vertical motion calculation method. The green circle indicates the position of the
Mayak industrial complex. The altitude of the air parcels is given in meters above ground level (AGL). The green circle in the altitude sections of the trajectories
ending at 3 PM and 5 PMUTC (maps surrounded by red frames), respectively, indicates the time and altitude (approximately 500m) the air parcels were in closest
proximity to the Mayak area.
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For the purpose of clarifying the situation, a soil-sampling
campaign was conducted by the French Commission for Independent
Research and Information on Radioactivity (CRIIRAD) non-
governmental organization (33) around the Mayak facilities in
December 2017 at a closest authorized distance of about 16 km.
Among the 8 soils sampled in various directions, only the 1 sampled
west-southwest from Mayak indicated a 106Ru deposited activity
estimated between 580 and 1,200 Bq·m−2. Inasmuch as abnormal,
again, this sole result is not sufficient to clearly demonstrate whether
or not the 106Ru originated from Mayak, as deposition levels are
not as high as one might expect from a major release. However,
the weak soil-sampling density may also be a good reason for the
plume deposition to escape from the investigation grid. More-
over, the atmospheric behavior (e.g., the transfer kinetics from
volatile RuO4 into particulate RuO2) and deposition of
106Ru are
not well understood, especially when released in its volatile form
of RuO4. At a longer distance (530 km in Bugulma, Russian
Federation) in the same direction, deposition of 106Ru (noticed
only on samples collected on September 26 to September 27, 2017
[11.3 Bq·m−2] and September 27 to September 28, 2017 [30 Bq·m−2])
matches with the hypothesis of a release from the Mayak indus-
trial complex on September 25, 2017, which, therefore, has to be
considered as a possible candidate for the source of the release of
106Ru. A detailed dispersion analysis using inverse dispersion
modeling techniques and field observations using the data from
the present study (airborne concentration and deposition) was
conducted to assess both the source location and the source term.
This modeling work also suggests that a hot-spot of 106Ru de-
position occurred in southeastern Bulgaria. Accordingly, pine needles,
oak leaves, forest litter, grass, and soil samples from this area confirm
that 106Ru deposition originating from a release on September
26, 2017 from the Mayak area was prone to produce these de-
positions in combination with rain events.* The 106Ru-deposited
activity in plants sampled in the southeast area of Bulgaria was
up to several tens Bq·kg−1, whereas they remained in the millibecquerel
per kilogram (mBq·kg−1) range in the western part of the country
where no rain occurred, while the variability of 106Ru volume
activity in the atmosphere remained somewhat limited across the
country. Other 106Ru detections occurred in early 2018 (until
March) in fallout and rainwater samples (in Norway, Poland,
Slovenia), and even in March 2019 (Poland), but they were assumed
to be induced by the resuspension of previously contaminated
soil particles, indicating that 106Ru had not yet completely
migrated from the topsoil layer.
Radioruthenium Forensics: Age Estimate, Chemistry, and Volatility.
Model age. Concomitant presence of minute amounts of shorter-
lived 103Ru together with 106Ru at about 15 locations allowed
estimating the model age of fission-derived radioruthenium (Fig.
6). We define the model age as the time elapsed after the end of
neutron irradiation of the nuclear fuel. In a simplified approach,
this roughly coincides with the discharge (unloading) of the spent
nuclear fuel from the reactor. The average 103Ru/106Ru activity
ratio was found to be in the range of (2.7 ± 0.9)·10−4, suggesting
an age of the released radioruthenium between 530 and 590 d
after the end of irradiation in a power reactor [assuming spent
nuclear fuel at the end of its fuel lifetime, stemming from a
standard power reactor, depending on reactor type and fuel (34)
and calculating decay according to the nuclides’ half-lives].
There have been speculations in a Science commentary (35)
that the release of 106Ru may have been associated with the pro-
duction of a powerful cerium-144 (144Ce; T1/2 = 285 d) source at
Mayak for a neutrino experiment in the Gran Sasso National
Laboratory (Italy). The experiment is set up around the liquid
scintillator “Borexino” (Italian diminutive of BOREX, Boron
Solar Neutrino Experiment). In an experiment called Short
Baseline Neutrino Oscillations with Borexino (SOX-Borexino),
the existence of a hypothetical fourth (sterile) should be tested
by positioning a powerful, yet compact 144Ce-144Pr source in the
vicinity of the Borexino detector to induce nuclear reactions of
the inverse β-decay type (36). According to Vivier et al. (37), the
Mayak reprocessing facility has been identified as the only po-
tential supplier to have the chemical capabilities to produce a
144Ce antineutrino source with sufficient activity (approximately
3.5 to 5 PBq 144Ce) and purity (38, 39). In this facility, sources
are produced using fission product solutions from spent fuel
reprocessing. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from VVER-
440 reactors for the purpose of production of petabecquerel
sources of 144Ce for sterile neutrino experiments is discussed in
Gerasimov et al. (40). The authors suggest reprocessing spent
fuel with a cooling period of 3 y after irradiation. Apparently,
“fresher” fuel with less cooling is not being considered, as the
extremely high activity levels in such fuel may cause problems in
the reprocessing and handling. For example, western reproc-
essing facilities, such as La Hague (France), do not consider
reprocessing of spent fuel until at least 4 (or even 10) y after
irradiation (34, 41). However, shorter irradiation duration of the
nuclear fuel (1 or 2 y instead of 3 y) is being discussed as a po-
tential way to yield higher specific activities of 144Ce in the entire
(mainly stable) fission-derived cerium fraction. Indeed, the onset
of stable Ce in the fuel becomes a crucial factor for the production
of such source. While the activity of 3.5 to 5 PBq 144Ce corresponds
to 30 to 43 g of this radionuclide only, this amount makes up less
than 1% of the total mass of Ce that is being isolated from the
spent fuel (40). The SOX experiment required a source of ideally
at least 3.7 PBq 144Ce with a total mass of 2.5 kg of ultrapure Ce
(including both stable and radioactive nuclides) (42), which is
challenging to produce. Previously, other radionuclides (includ-
ing 106Ru) were considered for the SOX-Borexino experiment
(36), but 144Ce was found to be easier to extract from spent
nuclear fuel. Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing is usually based on the
PUREX method (Plutonium Uranium Recovery by Extraction), in
which the UO2 fuel is chopped into smaller fragments and
dissolved in 7 to 7.5 MHNO3. Most fission products (including Ce)
are dissolved in the aqueous raffinate; however, a part of the Ru is
oxidized to highly volatile RuO4 and found in the off-gas, where it
has to be captured and treated. Fuel components (U and Pu) are
recovered by extraction into a kerosene/trin-butyl phosphate phase
Fig. 6. Age estimation of radioruthenium from various power reactor types
(boiling water reactor, BWR; pressurized water reactor, PWR; Russian Water-
Water-Energetic-Reactor, VVER) based on 103Ru/106Ru activity ratios of reg-
ular spent nuclear fuels (UO2 and mixed oxide fuel, MOX) at the end of their
fuel lifetimes. The light gray area represents the uncertainty of the ratio.
*O. Saunier, A. Mathieu, D. Didier, O. Masson, J. Dumont le Brazidec, Atmospheric mod-
eling and source reconstruction of radioactive ruthenium from an undeclared major
nuclear release. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., in review.
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before they are further processed and recycled. For the isolation of
the cerium fraction in the aqueous phase, complexing displacement
chromatography techniques were identified, which would yield a
cerium fraction with sufficient purity, which would then be
converted to CeO2 and sintered (43). The final product should
have fit into a capsule of <15 cm diameter, compact enough to
be considered as a point-like source (43).
A critical factor of the attempted 144Ce source is its required
extraordinarily high specific activity. While the specific activity of
144Ce per gram of fission-derived Ce can be increased by 28%,
when the VVER-440 fuel is irradiated for 2 y instead of 3 y (and
by 76% when irradiated for 1 instead of 3 y) (40), the reduction
of the cooling time from 3 to 2 y causes a gain in specific activity
by more than 140% (based on data from ref. 34). In fact, the
aspired specific activity of at least 3.7 PBq of 144Ce in 2.5 kg of
ultrapure Ce can hardly be achieved only by reducing the irra-
diation duration of the fuel (in theory, this goal is only barely
reachable when using 1-y-irradiated fuel), but can easily be
achieved by reducing the cooling period from 3 y down to ∼2 y
(even for 5 PBq sources and even from regular spent fuel at the
end of its fuel lifetime). The reduction of the cooling period of
the spent fuel may have been regarded as the only feasible way to
yield a sufficient activity of 144Ce in a yet reasonably small-sized
source volume that was needed for the SOX experiments. If the
106Ru release was indeed linked to the production of the SOX
source, these considerations concerning the specific activity of
the 144Ce source would explain the young age of the Ru fission
products at the time of the release. According to the source term
estimates, the estimated release of 250 TBq of 106Ru would
correspond to an accidental loss of about 7 to 10% of the 106Ru
contained in the amount of VVER-440 fuel (700 to 1,000 kg,
corresponding to 2 fuel assemblies) that would be necessary for the
production of a 3.5 to 5 PBq 144Ce source (assuming regular spent
VVER-440 fuel at the end of its lifetime, based on data from
ref. 34 and 2 y of cooling). In any case, the unusually young age of
the 103,106Ru of about 2 y after the end of irradiation in a power
reactor would match the hypothesis of a release of 106Ru during the
production of the 144Ce SOX source. Regarding this production,
the fact that the order of the 144Ce source was canceled by theMayak
facility shortly after the 103,106Ru release attracted the attention
of the nuclear community and initiated speculations whether
both events (the release of 103,106Ru and the cancelation of the 144Ce
order) may be linked (35). No finding of our research refuted or
disproved the hypothesis of a linkage between the radioruthenium
detection episode and the production of a 144Ce source.
If the radioruthenium came from the production of the 144Ce
source, and if spent fuel has been reprocessed before reaching
the end of its fuel lifetime in reactor, the above age estimate
would represent a slight underestimate, as the “youth-indicator”
103Ru would be present in “fresher” fuel in disproportionally
higher concentrations compared with 106Ru. The nonetheless
young age of the 103,106Ru also speaks against the “satellite hypothesis”
as such young radionuclide batteries would not typically be available,
because of a lack of facilities that can routinely handle such young
fuel (possibly with the exception of the Mayak industrial complex).
Particle size and solubility. The released 103,106Ru was found to be
evenly distributed on air filters and no larger 103,106Ru-rich
particles were found in autoradiographic imaging (SI Appendix,
Fig. S4) and scanning-electron microscopic investigations (SI
Appendix, Fig. S5). Therefore, it may be concluded that the radio-
ruthenium was released in a gaseous or extremely finely dispersed
particulate form (particle sizes <1 μm). At room temperature, RuO4
is an easily melting solid (melting point 25 °C), but due its high
vapor pressure and low boiling point (40 °C), it is notorious for
being a highly reactive and volatile substance (44), even from
solutions (45). It is a highly unstable compound and decomposes
to chemically inert RuO2 (and O2) in an explosive reaction when
heated above 100 °C. The explosive properties may also be
accident-relevant for the present release. Given its high re-
activity, a release of highly oxidizing, gaseous RuO4 would be
followed by subsequent reduction or decomposition to RuO2 on
[organic or inorganic (46)] atmospheric dust particles and trap-
ping on their surface. The lack of any traces of concomitant
radionuclides in the Ro5 aerosol filters suggests a high degree of
fractionation of the 103,106Ru from other radionuclides, which
would be achievable by a separation of highly volatile RuO4 from
other, less volatile radionuclides via the gas phase. Knowledge on
the 106Ru fractionation (gas/particle) would also have direct
consequences on deposition in the environment close to the
emission point. This is especially the case for the particulate
fraction in case of rain or for species that remain in gaseous
form. Various investigations at participating research institutions
suggest a radiopurity of the 103,106Ru of up to a factor of 104 over
concomitant radionuclides. Thus, we conclude that the release
most likely involved RuO4, which either was released directly or
possibly underwent chemical processing for its stabilization (e.g.,
trapping in NaOH or HCl) before its release into the environment.
The fact that no apparent stable element anomalies were found
in addition to the release supports the assumption that the release
was limited to the isotopes of Ru (16).
In chemical investigations, several research laboratories have
found that at least one of the 106Ru species on the filters was
highly soluble (about 50% within 10 min) when the filter was
immersed in pH neutral water. The insoluble fraction remained
insoluble even if the immersion duration was extended to 24 h. The
solubility was marginally greater in when a filter fragment was
immersed into 1 MHCl solution (24 h), namely to about 60%. The
filtrate was filtered through syringe filters with pore sizes of 470 nm
and 20 nm, respectively, which reduced the activity in the aqueous
phase only marginally, thus excluding the breakthrough of sus-
pended 106Ru-containing particles in the water, which might have
pretended dissolution. Assuming that the 106Ru was trapped on air
filters in the form of RuO2 (reduction product of RuO4), this high
degree of solubility comes unexpectedly, at least when the mac-
roscopic chemical behavior of RuO2 is extrapolated to the sub-
macroscopic scale of ultratrace levels of 106Ru. Hence, the results
may suggest that at least 2 species are present on the filter materials
and that half of the total amount of 106Ru is present in highly water-
soluble form. Solubility experiments in serum ultrafiltrate fluid
(SUF), however, reveal very high and rapid solubility (>90%) of the
106Ru on air filters, which were brought in contact with SUF to
simulate dissolution in the lungs. Two different kinetics were found
Fig. 7. Volatility tests of 106Ru trapped on an air filter from Vienna (2 replicates
with 30 Bq 106Ru pieces). The loss of mass is shown in green for comparison.
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to underlie the dissolution (SI Appendix, Fig. S2). The latter results
may indicate that the Ru is associated with 2 different types of
aerosol particles or particle surfaces, 1 of which may be binding 106
Ru more strongly than the other. In contrast to H2O, SUF contains
ligands that may out-compete surface binding sites for Ru.
Volatility. In heating experiments, the volatility of the Ru species
from the filter was investigated. We found that the 106Ru activ-
ities remained quite constant (with some fluctuations due to the
thermal deformation of the filter fragments causing geometrical
issues during the γ-measurement) (SI Appendix, Fig. S3) for the
temperature range between room temperature and 600 °C. From
700 °C to 1,000 °C, the activity levels in the filter fragments’ ashes
decrease rapidly, suggesting almost complete volatilization of the
Ru species in this temperature range (Fig. 7). In macroscopic
amounts, highly refractory RuO2 does not exhibit comparable
volatilization in this temperature range (47). In combination with
the solubility tests, this result suggests that the released Ru
species has not been (or not exclusively) RuO4, because one
would expect low volatility and solubility from its reaction
product RuO2. Instead, a mixture of several chemical species of
ruthenium may have been released.
Summary
Almost exactly 60 y after the Kyshtym and Windscale nuclear
accidents in 1957, both substantial sources of 106Ru in the
environment (23), a significant release of 106Ru occurred in the
southern Eurasian border region in September 2017. It led to
detectable yet innocuous levels of this airborne fission product
in the rest of Europe. Based on times series of detections at
various locations in Central Europe, the event was character-
ized as a short release. The plume duration lasted about 1 to 3 d
on average, depending on the location, with the exception of a
few areas (e.g., in Italy where the labeled air mass, once arrived,
stayed longer than elsewhere). The release was too substantial
to be associated with the incineration of a medical radionuclide
source. A satellite crash can also be excluded as the source of
the 106Ru. It is much more likely that the 106Ru escaped during
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, possibly in the course of the
miscarried production of a highly radioactive 144Ce source for
research applications in the Gran Sasso Laboratory in Italy.
This study confirms high radiopurity of the radioruthenium, an
age of about 2 y or less, as well as both relatively high solubility
and volatility of the Ru species on the air filters. According to
detection time series, a back-trajectory analysis, and chemical
considerations, the Mayak nuclear complex in southern Urals
should be considered as a likely candidate for the release.
Materials and Methods
Aerosol sampling is performed on a routine basis using medium- to high-flow
rate pumps (60 to more than 1,000 m3·h−1). Airborne radionuclide moni-
toring on a nation-wide scale is usually based on weekly sampling, but the
frequency may be increased by certain stations in unusual events, like the
present one. Depending on the network and organization, different kinds
of filter media are being used in Europe (glass fibers, glass plus cellulose,
polyvinyl chloride, or polypropylene), all having a high (>90%) collection
efficiency. After sampling, filters are typically pressed into pellets of various
diameters depending both on filter and detector sizes.
106Ru is a pure β-emitter and thus not directly measurable by γ-ray spec-
trometry. However, its detection can be achieved via decay of its daughter
rhodium-106 (106Rh), which reaches secular equilibrium within a few minutes
with its parent due to its short half-life (T1/2 = 30.1 s) and which is detectable
by de-excitation γ-photons of the excited state of its decay product:
palladium-106 (106Pd, stable). The radionuclide is first identified by its 621.9-
keV photopeak (emission intensity 9.87%) in a γ-ray spectrum and, once
identified, the presence of 106Ru can be confirmed by characteristic peaks at
1050.4 keV and 616.2 keV. All measurements were thus obtained by γ-ray
spectrometry using coaxial or well-type, high-purity germanium detectors.
Proper quantification should comply with recommendations in the Joint
Research Centre technical report provided by the European Commission (48)
regarding interferences and coincidence summing corrections. Indeed, these
corrections can be significant, reaching up to deviations of up to 25%,
depending on the detector and the counting geometry. For maximum ac-
tivity concentrations, uncertainties were typically ranging from 5 to ∼30%
depending on detector and sample features. An example of a γ-ray spectrum
exhibiting detectable activities of both 103Ru and 106Ru is shown in SI Ap-
pendix, Fig. S6. It exemplifies that, thanks to excellent energy resolution in
modern γ-ray detectors, the unique γ-ray peaks of 106Rh (106Ru) at 621.9 keV
and 616.2 keV are not disturbed by the presence of natural 214Bi (609.3 keV).
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